From Crimea to Kostiantynivka - Logistics Strikes & Ukraine's Fortress Belt

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Intro 0:00

0:00Given that Russia's special short-sharp military operation has now lasted longer than the First World War, I think it's safe to say

0:07that the last few years of Russian offensives in Ukraine haven't exactly set any speed records.

0:11But having ramped things up slightly in 2025, going into the 2026 campaign season, there was a general expectation that as in

0:18previous years, Russia would use the better weather to ramp up offensive activity.

0:22And so far, we've seen that kind of.

0:25There are places along the front where Russia has concentrated its traditional advantages in manpower and fires in order to make the

0:31Ukrainian defensive position extremely difficult and push forward.

0:35The city of Kostyantynivka at the southern edge of Ukraine's Donbas fortress belt probably stands as one of the most important and

0:41most high-profile examples there. At the same time, we've seen Ukrainians fight a very different campaign almost in parallel, focused on elements

0:49like deep strikes against the Russian economy, mid-range strikes against Russian military logistics, and trying to both stabilize the front where possible,

0:57while taking the initiative in part of Ukraine's south, and especially with regards to the politically sensitive Crimean Peninsula.

1:03And so today, as we reach the halfway point in 2026, I want to look at some of the current fighting in

1:07Ukraine and what it seems to tell us about the very different strategies being adopted by both sides.

1:12Some of the reasons the dynamics might have shifted compared to one or two years ago, and some of what we might

1:17expect to see in the coming months.

What Am I Talking About? 1:19

1:19To do that, I'll set some context for this campaign season and the tactics Russia has used in the past, and ask

1:24why the Russian offensive model might not be delivering the same territorial gains in 2026 that it did back in 2025.

1:31We'll then look at how the Russians appear to be potentially adapting that model to try and keep moving forward, with the

1:35city of Kostyantynivka serving as a case study.

1:38Then we'll switch over to look at some of what the Ukrainians are doing, including how some of the elements we focused

1:43on in previous episodes, long and middle-range strike, combined together to build up this overall strategic model of Ukrainian defense.

1:51If Kostyantynivka serves as the case study example for the ways that Russians can make life very difficult for the Ukrainians, we'll

1:57use Crimea as a salient example of the way the Ukrainians are trying to return the favor.

2:01I'll then bring that all together to try and make some closing But before we do that, I first need to throw

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Campaign Context 3:32

3:32So, let's start by quickly going back to the start of the 2026 campaign season and a couple of things that have

3:36set this year apart so far.

3:39When we discussed the situation earlier this year, as in 2025 and 2024, it was pretty apparent that while things varied depending

3:45on where on the front line you were talking about, in general, Russia had the offensive initiative.

3:50Ukraine was capable of localized counterattacks in some areas and was scaling up its long-range drone effort, but based on precedent from

3:562025 and 2024, the general expectation was for a scaled-up Russian offensive.

4:01That was both because the weather was likely to improve, potentially making it easier to carry out offensive operations, but also just

4:07out of sheer political necessity. Russia is still a long, long way from its stated territorial war goals.

4:13Ukraine, shockingly enough, has been pretty adamant that they won't be handing over things like the Donbas fortress belt without a fight.

4:19And some commentators have openly theorized that despite the Ukrainian resistance, among everything else, Russian military planning is to some extent, potentially

4:27partly hostage to a pair of factors.

4:30The military often appearing to convey the impression both the public and potentially Putin that they've advanced further than they have, and

4:36so needing to advance in order to match up with the while also making even loftier promises to the political leadership that

4:43with just that bit more additional funding, some more time, some more recruits, some more drones, etc., they'll absolutely definitely 100% be

4:50able to take these politically stated objectives, thus potentially salvaging this gigantic strategic sunk cost endeavor.

4:57Long before the start of this campaign season though, there were reason to suspect that wasn't true.

5:02And the Russian military just didn't have the resources or capabilities to cash the checks that its leaders might have been writing.

5:08And so far, the results we've seen from Russia in the first half of 2026, by many measures, seem to fall short

5:13even if what they managed to achieve in 2025.

5:16In territorial terms, for reasons we'll get into a little bit later on, Russian infiltration tactics so far just don't seem to

5:23be regularly delivering the same results that we saw back in 2025.

5:26At time of recording, based on just one of the open-source mapping tools, Russia's net territorial gain for the month from May

5:32to June 2026 was about 10 square miles, less than half the size of Manhattan Island.

5:38Another source which tends to be more bearish for the Russians, the ISW, actually had Russia at a net negative for that

5:44period. For what it's worth, I'd come down on the side of Russia still advancing, albeit at an absolutely glacial pace.

5:50But it's clear, at least so far, we haven't seen any kind of across-the-board sledgehammer offensive.

5:55Instead, Russia's military attention appears to have often been slightly more focused.

6:00The Donbas is very obviously still a key military consideration with the fortress belt city of Kostyantynivka arguably serving as a bit

6:07of a case study. Meanwhile, we've seen Ukraine fighting a very different campaign with different apparent objectives.

Challenges to the Russian Model 6:12

6:12But before we get to that, I think it's worth examining first why we might see the Russian model having more apparent

6:17difficulties now in 2026 than it has in previous years.

6:21While things can obviously vary a lot time to time, place to place, commander to commander, I think a very high-level observation

6:27supported by the data is that Russian offensive tactics have gone through a couple of stages of general evolution in this war.

6:33Especially in the beginning, but also out through battles like Vuhledar and even sometimes around Pokrovsk, massed mechanized assaults, so columns of

6:40armored vehicles, were fairly common. Those, however, suffered very, very badly because they were easy to spot observation drones, vulnerable to some

6:48of the prevalent systems of the conflict, suffering especially badly from remote laid mines, and they obviously created a very high churn

6:54in equipment stores. If you're yellowing a bunch of tanks on the regular, you're going to lose them on the regular.

7:00Putting more focus on dismounted infantry assaults then reduced the vulnerability armor and made these attacks harder to spot.

7:06But even relatively early on, organized formations of infantry in the open often proved attractive targets for one of the deadly combinations

7:13of the war in Ukraine, the spotting ISR drone and the artillery.

7:17Artillery can fire in any weather, and especially with things like DPICM cluster ammunition, it often didn't take that many cannon rounds

7:24in order to potentially break up an infantry attack and inflict significant casualties in the process.

7:29And anecdotally, I'll leave a source in the description, there's at least one battle I think that demonstrates that effect.

7:35Remember those North Korean troops fighting alongside the Russians that for a while many pro-Russian sources denied existed?

7:40Yeah, well, we're now at the point of their contributions being openly acknowledged and celebrated by both Moscow and Pyongyang, and we

7:47know more about some of their initial fights.

7:49Reportedly, in some of the early engagements when North Korean infantry were sent against Ukrainian positions, it corresponded with the Russians, remembering

7:56this is over Russian territory, putting up a whole bunch of ISR drones.

8:00What that meant is that a lot of the Ukrainian artillery were understandably nervous to open fire.

8:05Because if you reveal yourself by firing from your hot position while an ISR drone can see you, then that's basically an

8:11open invitation for a strike drone to come your way and try and dig you out of it.

8:15With limited Ukrainian artillery in play, North Korean tactics didn't generate unacceptable casualties, at least by their standards.

8:21Things like bomber drones and automatic grenade launchers could inflict some casualties, but if you have physically fit, motivated infantry on the

8:28attack with a high casualty tolerance, then that may not be enough.

8:32Reportedly though, when conditions shifted and the artillery was able to fire more freely, North Korean casualties spiked, results fell off, and

8:39their tactics subsequently had to adapt.

8:42That's only one anecdotal example and expressed in very general terms, but I think it highlights a broader point here.

8:48While we talk about drones being the overwhelming driver of casualties in Ukraine, which they currently are, and artillery having been pushed

8:54back to more of a secondary role in terms of casualty generation, I think it's important to remember that partly things that

9:00that way in the first place because the combination of artillery and spotter drones was so devastating, the tactics had to adapt

9:06to counter it. What the Russians came up with to both prey on Ukraine's weaknesses and also try and minimize Ukraine's strength

9:12in that responsive drone-corrected artillery fire, were infiltration tactics.

9:17To oversimplify, instead of sending a platoon of blokes to try and take a position, instead you send a platoon of blokes

9:23in ones or twos, one group after another, and you encourage them to try and advance and dig in somewhere behind the

9:29Ukrainian front line positions. The Russians, for lack of a better term, could almost play this like Minesweeper.

9:35Exploit the relatively poorest Ukrainian front line positions to send a group forward and if they hit a point of resistance and

9:41didn't make it, route the next one slightly differently until they start to filter through.

9:46Images like the one you see on the right there, which is released by the Russian MOD, illustrates a little bit of

9:51how this kind of thing can work.

9:52You just have a pair of Russian infantry in that case being shadowed by a drone making their way into a building,

9:57a sheltered position, where they can presumably be resupplied by cargo drops from other drones, potentially create some havoc and panic in

10:05the Ukrainian positions just by knowing they're there.

10:07And then eventually if enough Russian infantry manage to accumulate, you have a force that can actually undertake assault actions.

10:13This kind of thing minimize the artillery problem both because these teams are harder to spot and also because frankly, in a

10:19lot of cases, one or two guys isn't worth the expenditure in artillery shells necessary to eliminate them.

10:24Hence, much greater emphasis being pushed onto things like FPVs in the drone force to try and deal with them.

10:31Obviously, handfuls of infantry with small arms don't have a bunch of organic firepower, but the Russians came at that problem from

10:37another angle. They still employed significant amounts of cannon and rocket artillery.

10:41They integrated glide bombs in ever greater numbers to try and blast apart Ukrainian defensive positions and they started using longer range

10:47loitering munitions and strike drones to eliminate positions, go after Ukrainian artillery and also put pressure on supply lines.

10:54This was never a recipe for very rapid operational scale advances or limited casualties among the Russian infantry, but for a while

11:01it was a combination that seemed to work.

11:03We saw plenty of variations like the integration of motorcycles and light vehicles to get the advancing infantry groups moving faster and

11:10the improved Russian drone tactics of groups like Rubicon also made an impression.

11:14The question then is, if Russia still has all those ingredients available, what might have changed?

11:19And why the same or improved tactics applied in 2026 aren't delivering the same results they did in 2025, but instead less

11:26territory gained and greater claimed casualties.

11:30Based on what we've seen reported about this campaign season so far, a couple of elements might be coming together.

11:35Ukrainian monitoring of the front line generally seems to have improved, making it harder for infiltration groups to make it through undetected.

11:41And in turn, Russia's ability to get reconnaissance and strike drones deep behind Ukrainian positions appears to have gone backwards.

11:47We've talked in conceptual terms about the impact of Russia being largely cut off from Starlink or Ukraine rolling out greater numbers

11:53of interceptor drones. But to add to what the Ukrainians have been publicly claiming, there's some data from the Russian side that

11:59might give us a bit of clue as to what's happening.

12:01What you're seeing here is data from Lost Armor, essentially a Russian version of Oryx or WarSpot.

12:07They notably only track visually confirmed Ukrainian losses, not Russian ones.

12:11But when we're interested in the claimed effectiveness of Russian forces, they do have a couple of interesting data sets.

12:16The chart you see on the right there is the claimed hits month by month of one of Russia's more exquisite loitering

12:21munitions, the Lancet. Over time, these things have been produced in greater numbers, usually handed over to relatively elite operators, and also

12:29given a variety of new features, better guidance, larger warhead, and also a claimed significant range extension in a lot of models.

12:36And so, if nothing else had changed, you'd generally expect technical upgrades and greater production to lead to a larger number of

12:41hits over time. And for a while, that is what we saw.

12:45The chart you're seeing there doesn't just record hits, it includes damaged, destroyed vehicles, but also misses and cases where there's no

12:51footage to confirm the result. But the overall pattern is that apparent usage grew rapidly between 2022 and 2023, and then again

12:58between 2023 and 2024, and then started to first flatten out, and recently declined to levels close to what we were seeing

13:05back in 2023. Even then, some of those recent hits are actually multiple engagements of the same target.

13:11This section of road I was looking at, for example, showed three strikes, which were actually three engagements of the same Ukrainian

13:17self-propelled gun. And of the four most recent videos in the data set, three are of repeat engagements of the same Ukrainian

13:24target. But the key element we should be interested here, I think, isn't data methodology, it's distance.

13:29If you look at the section of the front we're talking a lot about today, for example, a lot of these hits

13:33have been on frontline targets. Many now technically in Russian-controlled territory because they took place back when it was Ukrainian-controlled.

13:40To give you a sense of scale, some of the deepest strikes here that I've circled on the map on the right

13:44there is where you're in the territory of a counter-battery hit against cannon artillery.

13:49And a disproportionate share of the Ukrainian artillery systems we're seeing hit, either by longer-ranged FPVs or loitering munitions like Lancet, are

13:56the shorter-ranged ones. About half of Ukraine's visually confirmed SPG losses for the year are the shorter-ranged 122-mm 2S1, suggesting Russian UAS

14:06might be much more dangerous to Ukrainian artillery closer to the front than it is to longer-range systems firing from further back.

14:12The observation here is while there was a lot of concern of Russia ramping up mid-strike activity towards the tail end of

14:182025, this year we've seen very intense activity, especially within a couple of dozen kilometers of the front.

14:24But between Starlink, interceptor and other factors, that mid-range threat just doesn't seem to have developed in the ways the Ukrainians feared

14:30or managed with their own systems.

14:32It also appears to be that many Ukrainian units are just getting more familiar and also comfortable with these Russian tactics, for

14:38lack of a better term. Especially early on in the Russian usage of these tactics or more recently where these tactics have

14:43been used against units that might not have been exposed to them before, Ukrainian units finding out they had pockets of Russian

14:49infantry in their rear might have had a significant emotional response to this news.

14:54Over time though, some Ukrainian units got more used to that kind of situation and seemed to subscribe more to the Chastobol

14:59school of thought when it came to being surrounded.

15:02The understanding now often seems to be the gray zone is the gray zone, positions might be intermingled, and if you do

15:08find out or suspect that you have Russian infiltrators in your area, you hold your position, maybe readjust your logistics, and then

15:14set about trying to get them cleared where possible.

15:17Speaking of which, we've also seen some tactical adaptation from the Ukrainians in terms of how they deal with infiltration.

15:23It's not uncommon to see footage of Ukrainian drone units trying to hunt down small units of infiltrators, for example, and there

15:28are also some usually higher-end Ukrainian units like reconnaissance units that have increasingly pivoted away from being reconnaissance units, given how much

15:36of that is now done by the drones instead, to instead be more dedicated clearing or anti-infiltration units.

15:42Ukrainian military reforms, including the switchover to the core system, likely helped, as did some of those aforementioned approaches to better dealing

15:49with infiltration teams. What this might capitalize is that individual infiltration teams just don't have a lot of combat power.

15:56They're at the end of a tenuous supply line, there's only so much equipment they can personally carry, and if they can't

16:01cause panic because the enemy is used to their presence, can't ambush supply lines effectively because they have to keep their heads

16:07down because the drones are hunting from them regularly, and can't accumulate because clearing operations happen before they can do so, it

16:13just becomes harder for them to deliver military results.

16:17There's also a final point to be made, I think, about logistics adaptation, because another component of the Russian model wasn't just

16:23heavy fires like glide bombs and infiltrating infantry, it was also trying to choke off supplies to forward Ukrainian positions to force

16:30an eventual withdrawal. To be clear, especially in some places like parts of the Donbas we're talking about today, Ukrainian logistics are

16:36still very dangerous. And as you can see on the right there, filmed on the road to Kostyantynivka, the Ukrainians do appear

16:43to have invested a lot in trying to make it at least somewhat safer.

16:46Drone netting over vital supply roads, light vehicles in that case electric scooters to help troops move more quickly, a lot of

16:52major logistics activity like evacuations commonly taking place in bad weather, and also as hinted by the UGV in the background there,

17:00also more drone-centric logistics. A simplified caricature of Ukrainian logistics in a contested area, for example, might look something like this.

17:08The trucks can carry a lot of supplies, but they don't try and get it as far as the front line.

17:12Instead, they take it as far as a UGV position.

17:16The UGVs, which might struggle with an FPV swarm, but probably aren't worth targeting for something like a Lancet or a fancy

17:22version of the Molniya, also don't carry the supplies to the front line.

17:25Instead, they only take it as far as a heavy drone position.

17:29These heavy drone positions are very supply intensive.

17:32They need a lot of munitions for their bombers, for example, batteries and other supplies.

17:36But what they can then do is carry the limited supplies needed by the front line infantry, so mostly food, water, and

17:41ammo, and drop those to supply forward positions.

17:44So you don't have to run the UGVs or the trucks all the way up to a front line trench.

17:49Now, that sounds great, but it both isn't universal.

17:52You'll still see Ukrainians in videos using things like hand carts, for example, or heavy rucks to move supply on foot.

17:58And it also falls over if you want to move the kind of cargo that can't readily be carried by a rotor

18:02drone, in particular, medical evacuation. Which all helps feed into the general observation we've seen this year, which is similar Russian tactics

18:10delivering relatively fewer territorial results without a commensurate fall off in Russian casualties.

18:17And speaking of Russian casualties, I also think there's one note to make here about the relationship between tactics and some of

18:22the reporting we've seen about it.

18:24For understandable reasons, casualties have always been one of the most contested things to estimate in this war, and alongside that, another

18:30contentious point has been the ratio between killed and wounded.

18:33Within that, for a while now, we've seen a number of sources claiming the gap between Ukrainian KIA and Russian KIA is

18:39significantly wider than the gap in casualties in general.

18:42That is, a wounded Ukrainian soldier is significantly more likely to survive than a wounded Russian one.

18:47Recently, we saw the US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, make a statement during a Senate hearing, where he suggested that for

18:53the first time, the Pentagon was assessing that Russian killed in action was starting to outnumber the wounded.

18:59Quote, "The number of Russian fatalities has exceeded the number of wounded, so the Ukrainians are not only fighting bravely, they're fighting

19:05effectively." End quote. Now, if that estimate is anywhere close to true, by historical standards, it would be absolutely remarkable.

19:12We are talking medieval standards of battle wound survivability.

19:16Even in the pre-penicillin era of World War I, wounded on the Western Front well outnumber the killed.

19:22And so, of course, instantly you'll see pro-Russian sources come out and say these ratios can't possibly be anywhere close to correct.

19:28And because of a disparity in firepower, they'd actually expect the Ukrainians to have a worse kill-to-wounded ratios than the Russians.

19:34Alternatively, you might see more pro-Ukrainian sources taking these claims pretty much as a given and saying they prove that Russia has

19:40no military medical system to speak of.

19:43But one important factor to consider there is where both sides' casualties are likely to be suffered.

19:48A lot of Ukrainian casualties are taken by support elements like drone teams or logistics groups or rotating forces behind the front

19:55line. If they are wounded, those might have a relatively reasonable chance of medical evacuation and treatment.

20:01In terms of Ukrainian infantry casualties, given that a lot of the time they're going to be the ones defending, at worst,

20:06a casualty's going to be taken in a front-line position, a trench, a basement.

20:10And if that happens, make no mistake, medical evacuation is going to be very, very difficult.

20:15You might have to move an individual back on foot several kilometers, potentially wait for bad weather until a UGV or a

20:21vehicle can come up to take them the rest of the way.

20:23But with infiltration tactics, think for a moment about where Russians are likely to be hit.

20:28In order to carry out infiltration attacks, Russian infantry, by necessity, have to expose themselves.

20:33They have to head forward. And if, as in the majority of cases, their luck eventually runs out and they are hit,

20:39the two places it's likely to happen are either in the no-man's-land gray zone or behind Ukrainian lines.

20:45If infiltration is already a difficult, high-failure-rate exercise for troops that are in fit and fighting condition and fully mobile, a bloke

20:52who's just copped a whole bunch of frag from a drone-dropped munition probably isn't going to be able to run a couple

20:57of 7-minute miles making it back to their own line for treatment.

21:00It's not likely that a wounded Russian is going to find four colleagues with a stretcher to pull him out of there.

21:04And to compound it all, you have to remember that demographically speaking, these are some very old armies.

21:10Your average 19 or 20-year-old might not be nearly as indestructible as they think they are, but in comparative physical terms, they

21:16are close. And they might handle a long march while wounded a lot better than someone with pre-existing conditions in their 40s

21:22or 50s. This is something I think that is sometimes glossed over about the manpower intensive nature of infiltration tactics.

21:29Yes, the fact you're using small groups primarily is going to constrain your casualty rate somewhat, but losses in per- centage terms

21:35are likely to be very high, and of those losses, you'd expect a relatively high proportion killed.

21:42So, if some elements of Russian infiltration tactics aren't delivering the same results in 2026 that they might have in 2025, what

21:48about the flip side? What about some of the elements that still seem to work some of the time?

21:53We've seen that sometimes, for example, using bad weather to cover offensive activity still works.

21:58It might restrict drone teams on both sides, but not friendly artillery, for example, that can still fire on known enemy defensive

22:03positions and provide an opportunity for resupply or troops to try and move forward.

22:08Russian glide bombs remain painfully effective for Ukrainian defensive positions, and the old approach of using large numbers of drones to try

22:14and create localized logistic squeezes on Ukrainian forces problematize rotation and resupply, as well as critically go after Ukrainian drone teams to

22:23try and suppress their activities also can work.

22:27Russia has continued to scale up its drone forces both in terms of personnel quantity and the production of things like FPVs.

22:34They've introduced new types, new tactics, continued to test and adapt doctrine on how drones should be used with a net result

22:41that while they might be behind in some areas like interceptors and mid-strike, especially in certain sectors, they can create absolutely dismal

22:47conditions for Ukrainian logistics and defending Ukrainian troops and drone operators.

22:52And the net result is that especially in cases where Russia is focused and able to take the time, conditions for Ukrainians

22:58defending a particular sector can become very, very hard.

23:02The bloke on the right there, for example, briefly interviewed as part of a recent documentary, is rotating out of a forward

23:07Ukrainian position after 93 days. For comparison, during the First World War, a British Tommy in the trench might expect to spend

23:15maybe 3 to 6 days right up on the firing line, with additional time spent in the support trenches or reserve lines,

23:21and fairly regular rotations out of the trench system entirely.

23:24But, as we've said repeatedly in the past, rotation in Ukraine, especially in the most intense sectors, is just so dangerous that

23:31forces can't do it as often as they might like.

Kostyantynivka 23:34

23:34And that interview was with troops pulling out of perhaps one of the most intense sectors of the front.

23:38Let's talk about the battle for While there's increasingly now an entire Ukrainian fortification system behind it, Ukraine's so-called fortress belt cities

23:47are still a key element of their defense in the Donbas.

23:50The northernmost section of the belt had the largest pre-war population centered on Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, with this particular city, Kostyantynivka, serving

23:58essentially as the southern tip. As you can see, compared to Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, it's significantly further south and also the furthest

24:05east, meaning that, as illustrated by that somewhat older map on the right there, it kind of jumps out from the rest

24:11of the defensive position. The main G-LOC, primary supply line for Kostyantynivka for some time now, has basically been a single road

24:18that connects the city to Druzhkivka, which you can also see mapped on the right there.

24:23The before and after you can see on screen here compares a relevant section of the front on the 1st of January

24:272026 to roughly 6 months later.

24:30As you can see, in many places, the Russian advance has been broad but incremental.

24:35After taking Siversk, for example, grinding closer and closer to Mykolaivka.

24:39Other areas, like the zone around Chasiv Yar, have comparatively barely moved, but Kostyantynivka has found itself wrapped in the proverbial gray

24:47zone. As with so many urban agglomerations the Russians have had to butt their heads against, rather than just being able to

24:53storm the place, the Russians have steadily made it harder and harder to hold.

24:57Russian drone operators have tried to make it harder to resupply.

25:00Russian infiltration teams have moved further and further around the town and even into the city itself, creating a steadily larger gray

25:06zone that makes it harder for the Ukrainian defense to remain cohesive and for its supply lines to be kept intact.

25:12In a recent documentary I'll link down in the description, some rather brave journalists decided to take that last road from Druzhkivka

25:18towards Kostiantynivka. And even based on just some of the images and footage they took, I think there's plenty of evidence to

25:25point to how this Russian approach can play out.

25:27For example, along that supply road, you'll see plenty of examples of vehicles that have clearly been struck at some point with

25:33the near omnipresence of massive anti-drone cages point to where their operators probably saw the threat coming from.

25:39Likewise, along a lot of this road, you'll see the Ukrainians having set up extensive anti-drone defenses.

25:45Netting, for example, is extremely common and you'll also occasionally see Ukrainian mobile fire teams along the road.

25:51Small groups of infantry tasked with trying to shoot down Russian drones when they appear.

25:55Outside of some rarer cases and opportunities like bad weather or low light, as you get closer and closer to front-line positions

26:02in the city, supply vehicles start to become rarer and rarer.

26:05Instead, you see things like this, dismounted troops pushing cargos in handcarts on the understanding that especially at longer ranges where Russia

26:13has to primarily operate more expensive and more exquisite drones and loitering munitions, a single bloke with a cart, especially one who

26:19can rapidly scatter into the trees, might not be considered a worthwhile target.

26:23You'll also see plenty of stuff like this, destroyed logistics UGVs by the side of the road, which I think emphasizes the

26:29point that these small cargo carriers should be as cheap and attritable as possible when used in these kind of areas because

26:34in that case, even when they're destroyed, they might still be doing their job.

26:38A single unit might be able to carry more than several infantrymen and each one that cops a drone might be a

26:43Ukrainian infantryman that doesn't. And if you look at some of the comments made on camera by Ukrainian troops rotating out of

26:49those forward positions, from our perspective, there are two main observations that immediately stand out.

26:54One, to put it politely, no one has a single nice thing to say about the situation in the city itself.

26:59No one's breaking, but everyone pretty much agrees the situation absolutely sucks.

27:04The second thing to note, in line with a trend we've seen much more broadly, is that equipment choices seem to be

27:08very much mirroring the omnipresence of the drone threat.

27:12In an infantry section, you might have a couple of blokes with the standard assault rifle, but one member of the section

27:17at least with a shotgun. This bloke apparently took that idea even further by adopting the Call of Duty approach of carrying

27:22two primary weapons, so he could rapidly switch between the AK and the shotgun.

27:27This is not something Ukrainian troops are likely doing because carrying several kilograms of additional weapon system and ammo is character building.

27:34They do it because even though a lot of the recent media attention focuses on Ukrainian innovations in the drone space, the

27:40Russian drone force and supply of things like FPVs in particular are massive and dangerous.

27:46At the time of recording then, there's a lot of uncertainty around exactly how things are right at the front, but based

27:51on what we've seen come out in the open source, I think the following is broadly what's likely.

27:55You now have a situation where both Ukrainian defenders and Russian infiltrators are mixed together in the city itself.

28:02In quantitative terms, especially closer to the city, Russian drones have a quantitative advantage, and it's already become very difficult for the

28:09Ukrainians to resupply, rotate, and reinforce those forward positions.

28:13Based on past precedent, I think the most likely expectation is that eventually Russia will be able to push the Ukrainians out

28:20from Kostyantynivka. At that point, the city will initially still be in the gray zone until Russia can bring more and more

28:25elements like drone operators up, push the kill zone back, and try and establish momentum and conditions necessary to push further forward.

28:33That's obviously not a certain outcome, but based on the way the last couple of months have gone, it does seem like

28:37the most likely at this point.

28:39The reason I bring all that up because it actually serves as a bit of a microcosm of what the Russian offensive

28:44looks like in 2026. And within that, there's bright sides for both Moscow and Kyiv.

28:49From Moscow's perspective, it arguably demonstrates that when the Russians focus their efforts, focus their assets, that combination of fires, drone teams,

28:56and infiltration tactics can still problematize and unravel even sometimes very strong Ukrainian defensive positions.

29:03And if they are able to overcome the city, it might set the stage for some further advances.

29:08It would arguably demonstrate that at least here, Russia was able to take an objective in the Ukrainian fortress belt proper.

29:14On the flip side, from a Ukrainian perspective, this battle is generally accepted to have started around October 2025, suggesting it's taken

29:21the Russians the better part of 8 months to not entirely take this objective, which if you extrapolate out, might bode well

29:27for Kyiv's ability to frustrate Russian ambitions in the Donbas for a long, long time.

29:32My key point here isn't the current iteration of Russian tactics can't deliver results, it clearly can, but at a rate and

29:39level of investment that raises more than a few question marks.

What to Watch From Russia? 29:42

29:42Going forward then, what are some of the things we've started to see or might see in terms of further Russian adaptation?

29:48For starters, we've begun to see attempts and are likely to see more attempts to mitigate some of Ukraine's relative military strengths.

29:54Middle strike drones going after Russian logistics are a big one that we'll come back to when we talk about Ukraine properly

29:58in a moment, but we have anecdotally already started to see more cases like the one on the right there, where you

30:03have a Russian logistics vehicle that isn't just relying on electronic warfare, which isn't a reliable solution when you're dealing with drones

30:09that might have AI terminal guidance, and instead some kind of actual hard kill protection.

30:14In the case on the right, that takes the form of a technical, so a bloke with a machine gun on the

30:18back of an escorting vehicle, who in that case isn't able to successfully intercept the incoming Ukrainian drone and decides to leg

30:24it about the 600 m mark, but I think it's likely that Russian efforts in this area are much more likely to

30:29scale up than they are to peter out.

30:31Secondly, historically we've often seen Russia try and imitate areas where Ukraine gains success, and so a greater Russian emphasis on trying

30:38to duplicate or replicate or build on the mid-strike success seems like a relatively safe bet.

30:44As a recent example, we have seen a number of Russian mid-range strikes against Ukrainian gas stations, presumably in part since those

30:50are both logistically important, but also don't require the kind of dynamic targeting capabilities that something like a truck or a train

30:56might. In terms of the actual UAS and loitering munitions themselves, they already have some reasonable platforms with a lot of legs.

31:03The problem likely isn't going to be developing a weapon system equivalent to something like the Hornet or the FP-02, but instead

31:09comp compensating for the advantage the Ukrainians have in terms of affordable, reliable, long-range communications, namely the fact that they can use

31:16Starlink. The first 16 satellites in the so-called Rassvet constellation were launched on March 23rd, and while one of those satellites saw

31:24its orbit deteriorate and is believed lost, 15 remain in orbit.

31:28Each Rassvet 3 satellite weighs about 370 kg reportedly, and while you're definitely not going to get regular sustained connectivity with 15

31:36satellites in orbit, they're clearly trying to build up.

31:39And on what I'm sure is a completely unrelated note to this and other Russian space-based capabilities, we also saw two cases

31:45of Ukrainians going after a comparatively new target type, namely Russian space communication and control centers.

31:52On the 22nd of June, Russia's largest space communication center, the Dubna facility around Moscow, was struck by Ukrainian one-way attack drones.

32:00As you can see on the right there, satellite images suggest that resulted in a couple of holes being put in buildings

32:05at the complex, which I'm sure did absolutely no damage given space control centers are famous for not containing any sensitive electronics

32:12or components. Later that same week, on the 24th of June, another facility, this time in the Vladimir region, was also struck

32:19by Ukrainian one-way attack drones, and as you can see, is looking slightly worse for wear, because while we can't be sure

32:25exactly what the interior of that facility looks like, I'm fairly confident that primary satellite dish is going to need more than

32:30a roll or two of duct tape.

32:32These facilities were very clearly deliberately included in Ukrainian target list, and someone made the decision to dedicate drones against them.

32:39And while it's always possible that might have been just because they considered generically valuable or to push the Russians to better

32:44defend them, I'd suggest it might provide one point of evidence the Ukrainians do regard Russian space capabilities as relevant to the

32:51war and are keen to try and mess them up if at all possible.

32:55The final point is it seems increasingly likely that either in the second half of this year or early next year, Russia

33:00will have to do something about its manpower position.

33:03Even leaving aside Ukrainian claims for a moment, Russian data suggests that the rate of recruitment into the military has slowed.

33:10At the same time, we've covered some of the very ambitious plans the Russian military has announced in terms of scaling up

33:15its units and especially dramatically increasing the size of its unmanned systems force.

33:20Just from a mathematical perspective, I'd argue in that kind of scenario something eventually has to give.

33:25You can't rely on manpower intensive infiltration tactics while also scaling up your conventional maneuver units, while also scaling up the drone

33:33force, and somehow provide for the entire thing using a diminishing source of recruitment.

33:38Now, whether that takes the form of a new system of incentives or alternative sources of recruitment or some kind of overt

33:45or covert additional mobilization, we don't know.

33:47The point is by Russia's own numbers, the manpower math no longer works.

33:52And so I think it's likely that at some point after kicking the can down the road some more, something or several

33:57things are at least attempted to try and balance out that equation.

34:01Which gets us to the Ukrainian side of this campaign.

the Ukrainian Campaign 34:02

34:05Because while I've been very comfortable saying over the last several years that Russia clearly has the initiative on the battlefield, at

34:10this point it's a little bit murkier.

34:13Russia is clearly in a position where it has the resource advantage and is able to pick its offensive battles, but Ukraine

34:18has also very clearly demonstrated that it can pick more than a couple of fights of its One thing we've sometimes seen

34:24with Ukrainian battles in the past, but arguably not as much this year, is the Ukrainians pouring resources into defensive battles, grinding

34:31it out around a point that the Russians effectively choose.

34:33Bakhmut was arguably the classic example here with the Russians and especially Wagner designating it a key objective and the Ukrainians dedicating

34:40a lot of resources to holding it, arguably longer than it made military sense to do so.

34:45What we're seeing now though is arguably more a case of Ukraine trying to, in strategic terms, fight around the problem.

34:52A lot of resources still do get dedicated to defending against whatever Russia's offensive focus at the moment is, but plenty of

34:58other assets are dedicated to fighting a very different kind of war.

35:01One that tries to do things like leverage long and middle-range drone strikes to stretch the Russian air defense system and then

35:07create issues on other parts of the front that aren't Russia's current primary focus.

35:12Recently, for example, we talked about the Ukrainian long-range strikes on Moscow.

35:15Those and follow-up strikes did by themselves succeed in doing some economic damage.

35:20The city's primary oil refinery, for example, is reportedly going to be offline at least through the end of 2026 and potentially

35:26into 2027. We also theorized at the time from Ukrainian perspective, one of the best results the strike could have is if

35:33it caused the Russians to pull even more air defenses towards Moscow because every valuable Pantsir-S1 protecting Russian optics in the capital

35:41can't be protecting Russian forces elsewhere.

35:43And lo and behold, that might be exactly what we've seen.

35:47Just between the 19th and 21st of May, for example, seven new air defense towers were identified being constructed in the north

35:54and east of Moscow. Even when towers aren't constructed, we've sometimes seen videos like this one appearing to show a Pantsir being

36:00installed by helicopter on the top of a residential apartment building, which might suggest the number of new air defense positions is

36:06even greater than the number of towers would suggest.

36:09Moscow State University and coincidentally the building next door where Putin's daughter reportedly works seems to be in the process of getting

36:15a new S-400 battery to protect it.

36:18And I think it's reasonable to assume the new positions identified so far might not be the end of the story.

36:23Beyond just the effect of stretching Russian air defenses, I don't want to dwell too long on the long-range strike component this

36:28episode because we've talked about in the past, but it is worth noting we have seen some recent hits on strategically significant

36:34targets like the one you see in the satellite image here, an electronics facility in Voronezh believed to contribute to the Russian

36:41missile industrial base that was explosively renovated apparently by a number of Storm Shadow / Scalp cruise missiles.

36:47In other cases, we've seen targets hit at much longer distances by Ukraine's domestically developed systems.

36:53That was the case on the right there with the Progress facility in Cheboksary that was hit with the visual evidence we've

36:59got so far suggesting the use of Ukrainian Flamingo cruise missiles.

37:02I included this one specifically as an example though to serve as a bit of a reminder and a warning.

37:07The image you see on the right there is of the facility which is critical to the production of things like the

37:12Kometa-M jam-resistant antenna that Russia uses extensively in things like its Shahed-style one-way attack drones.

37:19And if you just give a casual observer this image, they might understandably conclude that workers generally perform better when they have

37:25access to things like roofs and floors, and so production at this facility is probably going to take a hit.

37:31But this is a case where details matter.

37:33The facility appears to have been attacked by multiple Flamingos, not all of them made it through, and the ones that did

37:39mostly impacted that building which is the administration facility.

37:43Now, I doubt there'll be no impact on production at the facility, although a cynic might suggest that by blowing up the

37:48admin building the Ukrainians might actually push output higher.

37:51But generally speaking, there is going to be all the difference in the world between flattening an admin building and flattening a

37:56production facility a few dozen or 100 m away.

37:59There are however decently some worrying signs in these recent strikes for the Russians.

38:03Not only is the frequency of things like Flamingo cruise missiles being mixed in with the drones apparently up, even if the

38:09sample size is small, the data does seem to point to these flocks becoming more dangerous.

38:13Flamingos appear to be hitting or nearly hitting their assumed targets more regularly, and images like the one on the right there

38:19also seem to suggest they might be capable of flying lower now, something which would potentially make them harder for Russian air

38:24defense systems to detect and deal with.

38:27Getting back to the Ukrainian mid-strike effort though, and how it fits into this overall campaign, we've seen a couple of target

38:32types emphasized. Air defense systems to make it easier for other strikes to get through, mobile logistics vehicles like trucks and trains

38:38that make it possible to sustain military activities in an area, and also a pretty significant number of fixed logistics targets.

38:45Think port loading facilities, oil storage tanks.

38:48And what we've seen more of recently, albeit usually in specific regions, is also local energy targets.

38:54Energy facilities like the power substation strike in Crimea on the right there might seem like a bit of an outlier, but

39:00part of the intended impact here might be the potential second order effects.

39:04The modern Russian military, like most mechanized forces, runs on fuel, especially diesel.

39:09Traditional consumers like trucks and armored vehicles obviously need it, but so too do front line dismounted troops.

39:14They need to be able to charge and run their communications, their drones, their electronics.

39:19And so anything that squeezes fuel availability isn't just a constraint on force mobility, it's a constraint on force combat power.

39:25When you have power disruptions in an area, often what happens is a lot of consumers switch over to backup generators.

39:31Everyone doing that causes demand for diesel and gasoline to spike, and therein you can see the problem.

39:37This is why I mentioned electrical facilities as more of a niche or localized Ukrainian target.

39:42Knocking out a power facility in central Russia isn't going to deliver the Ukrainians a lot of payback relative to the effort

39:47required to strike it. It might make people miserable, but without immediate military results.

39:52But if you pick an area of military significance relatively close to the front where logistics are already strained, this is just

39:59one more way the Ukrainians might put more pressure on already overstretched fuel supply lines.

Crimea 40:04

40:04Speaking of which, let's talk about perhaps the exemplar of the current Ukrainian strategy of fighting around the problem, Crimea.

40:11As we covered in recent episodes, Crimea in particular and southern Ukraine in general, so roping in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions

40:17as well, have been on the receiving end of a lot of Ukrainian drone resources and also localized ground counterattacks.

40:23This is less an area that Russia decided as a priority for offensive activity and more somewhere that Ukraine has decided to

40:29make a problem. Something exemplified by the fact the Russian governor of Crimea has now declared a state of emergency.

40:36A few weeks ago we talked about a ramp up, especially in middle and long-range Ukrainian strikes against Russian logistics in the

40:42area, and even since then those have ramped up.

40:45Drone strikes have been carried out against additional ferries that Russia uses to cross the Kerch Strait and resupply Crimea from Russia

40:51proper. Crimea's ports, loading facilities, and coastal radars have been struck repeatedly, and the damage, especially to oil storage infrastructure, has really

40:59started to aggregate. As a target type, oil storage tanks are a bit of a weird one.

41:04On one hand, you might consider them a bit attacker-friendly, so to speak, because if you give them so much as a

41:09reasonably energetic tickle with a one-way attack drone, assuming they're full, those stored hydrocarbons are going to do a lot of the

41:15remaining destructive work for you. But in terms of cost or a potential effect on an opponent, an individual oil storage tank

41:22isn't a huge deal. From a logistics perspective though, as you begin to lose more and more of them, the value of

41:27each one hit starts to compound.

41:30Each remaining tank represents a greater share of your remaining storage capacity, and the loss of storage capacity means not just the

41:36loss of whatever supply was stored in that tank, it also means you have less buffer and are more reliant on regular,

41:42uninterrupted supply. And in Crimea, you can bet the Ukrainians are trying to make sure supply is anything but consistent.

41:48In one recent case, for example, that I'll include as a bit of a lighthearted aside, there was a recent case of

41:53a Russian military blogger posting on Telegram with a smiley face saying that a large supply of fuel had recently been delivered

41:59to Crimea, only for that to be followed shortly thereafter by a Ukrainian strike that hit a large amount of fuel in

42:05Crimea, which led to the Ukrainians publicly posting relatively sarcastic thanks to said Russian military blogger.

42:11Now, were the Ukrainians actually reliant on a Telegram vague post in order to know that fuel had arrived and do the

42:18targeting? I would suggest probably not.

42:20But, the fact so much flak was thrown around on the Russian side about the incident, I think points to an overall

42:25stress point. And the fuel situation in Crimea is far from ideal from a Russian perspective.

42:30And there's two other pieces of evidence that I think help establish that.

42:33One, the Russian authorities there again, ostensibly temporarily, halted the sale of diesel and petrol to the civilian population.

42:40Meaning Russians there who wanted to shell out on the black or gray market might have to be ready to hand over

42:45the likes of three bucks a liter, or for the Americans listening, about 12 bucks a gallon.

42:50And for those who couldn't afford or couldn't access those kind of supplies, there was always the longer and longer fuel lines.

42:56The last couple of weeks have seen a fair share of videos on social media of Russian tourists in Crimea complaining this

43:01isn't exactly the experience they were looking for when they planned their holiday.

43:05And we've seen significant traffic around places like the Kerch Bridge heading back towards Russia.

43:11To be fair, the fuel situation in Crimea might be particularly tough due to the peninsula's logistical situation.

43:17But, at this point most Russian regions have reported at least some fuel sale restrictions.

43:22And one Russian official was recently fairly frank about the fact that a lot of this traces back to Ukrainian strikes on

43:26refineries. But, in Crimea the issues run deeper than just those burning refineries.

43:31Then you have a fight over the logistics links not connecting Russia to Crimea, but instead Crimea and the Donbas to the

43:37front lines of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia.

43:40This is where frequent attacks on things like trucks and trains come in.

43:43And even compared to our previous episode on this topic a couple of weeks ago, things do appear to have ramped up.

43:49At the time, we were talking about a visually confirmed hit rate of about 20 to 30 Russian trucks and vans being

43:54hit per day. More recently, that appears to be closer to 40 a day.

43:58193 visually confirmed hits on Russian trucks and vans over the course of 5 days, with 800 in total since early May

44:05being hit more than 20 km from the front line.

44:08Now, I think even just that trend in the data by itself is interesting, but digging into the released footage, there's another

44:13interesting observation I want to make.

44:15Namely, a lot of this footage is good, like unreasonably good.

44:19If you look at this footage here, clipped to avoid any un-YouTube-friendly elements, and you'll immediately see this is a long long

44:25way from the PS2-tier resolutions and '90s-era latencies we saw in some drones earlier in the war.

44:32And yet, these are clearly FPV strikes.

44:34You can see the rotors, and the geolocations are so far behind the front line, we're talking up to 60 km, that

44:39we can probably rule out fiber optics.

44:42Which leaves us with the conclusion that, at least in some cases, the Ukrainians are able to operate FPVs at long ranges

44:48against Russian supply lines in the south of the country, and they're able to do so maintaining a very good quality connection,

44:54which probably correlates with improved hit rates.

44:56I'd also note that even though the number of visually confirmed hits has spiked significantly, there is still a massive gap between

45:02what we're seeing and what the Ukrainians are publicly claiming.

45:05We've gotten to the point now where with some system categories, like tanks, there's usually not an enormous gap between what the

45:11Ukrainians are claiming destroyed and what's visually confirmed destroyed.

45:14With vehicles and fuel trucks, though, the gap is still about 10 to 1.

45:18We're seeing about 40 trucks destroyed per day in the visual evidence, the Ukrainians are claiming 400 plus.

45:24So, to an extent, I'd argue that just how bad the squeeze on Russian logistics in the south becomes really depends on

45:30where the true number is. Between the floor estimate, which is how many we visually see hit, and the soft upper estimate,

45:37which is how many the Ukrainians claim.

45:39It's probably fair to say both that footage isn't released of 100% of strikes, and also that forces at war tend to

45:44exaggerate enemy losses. Where that leaves the actual number within that range, we can't be entirely But, before we move on, there

45:51is one last data clue to add.

45:53The Ukrainian ePoint system, that rewards units who can prove the destruction of Russian targets with points they can exchange for more

45:59equipment, recently released its aggregates for the month of May.

46:02That didn't show any claimed increase in the number of Russian personnel being hit, but the number of strikes happening more than

46:0850 km from the front line doubled compared to April, and the number of UGV logistics and evacuations missions, because those earn

46:15points as well, increased by about 40%, which I think provides one extra piece of evidence of Ukraine trying to harden their

46:21own supply lines while aggressively going after Russian ones.

46:25Then, as well as the trucks themselves, we've got a sequel to an old 2022 classic, the Battle of the Bridges.

46:31You remember a couple of episodes back I said that if Ukraine's drone capabilities continue to mature and it's able to scale

46:36up in the south, one of the things we might eventually expect them to start doing is going after the bridges connecting

46:41Crimea to Ukraine proper in a big way.

46:44Well, it turns out eventually ended up meaning a couple of weeks.

46:48We've seen visual evidence of strike after strike, not just on the bridges connecting Crimea to the rest of Ukraine, but also

46:54bridges within Crimea itself and across Zaporizhzhia and Kherson.

46:58This isn't just something Ukrainians are claiming, we've often got satellite images and even statements by Russian officials to back it up.

47:04I think it's fair to say this bridge is fair mounted for the immediate future, for example, while in this case the

47:09Ukrainians appear to have scored a bit of a two-for-one, successfully collapsing a road bridge onto a rail link, leaving both a

47:15bit of a non-factor, at least for the immediate future.

47:18Just looking at that potential choke point we've talked about in the past connecting Crimea to the rest of Ukraine, the map

47:24on the right there shows just six of the bridges that have been hit from west to east.

47:28The number of hits and amount of damage being done obviously varies by location, but when you see this many related targets

47:34being hit in rapid succession, I think it's fairly safe to assume you're not dealing with opportunistic targeting or coincidence, but instead

47:40a deliberate effort. Now, what's particularly interesting to observe here is this is not the first time the Ukrainians or the Russians

47:46have chosen to focus on bridges.

47:48All the way back in 2022, for example, going after a particular Russian bridge was a major apparent part of the Ukrainian

47:54strategy in the Kherson region. At that point, and at numerous other points in this war, it hasn't always proven particularly decisive.

48:02And I want to show you an image that illustrates part of the reason why, and also why things may now have

48:06partly changed. This is a picture of the Henichesk bridge, so connecting the northeastern corner of Crimea to the mainland, and I

48:13think it highlights some of the problems Ukraine has historically faced going after Russian-controlled bridges.

48:18Step one, you punch some holes in the primary bridge itself.

48:21As you can see, that step has been accomplished here.

48:25It was also accomplished back in 2022 using things like Storm Shadow, but as you can see, while it's possible to make

48:30a bridge partly or fully temporarily impassable using these kind of munitions, actually causing them to collapse beyond the point where they

48:37can be repaired is much more difficult.

48:39So, unless you're actually able to comprehensively destroy the thing, you end up using expensive munitions as asphalt hole punches that are

48:46eventually at least partially repaired. And you may not even get a total temporary stop to traffic because the Russian engineers can

48:52step in, as they visibly have here, and set up a pontoon bridge.

48:56You can see it on the left.

48:57Those can't handle as much traffic, vehicles can't move as quickly, and there are going to be restrictions on how heavily loaded

49:03they can be. But if you're just using expensive cruise missiles, pontoon bridges do raise a problem.

49:08They're fairly cheap, and you can't really afford to keep slinging cruise missiles into them only for the Russians to repair them

49:15and have another one going within a day or two.

49:17In extremis, and given enough time, they might even do something like you see on the right-hand side there, where you just

49:22pile up a crap ton of earth to bridge most of the gap.

49:26As advanced and capable as modern weapons have become, against a lot of things, including top-end cruise missiles, dirt remains a fairly

49:32compelling counter. The difference in 2026, though, is long- and mid-range strike is often handled by a high-low mix of munitions.

49:39The Ukrainians still have some capable air-launched cruise missiles, for example, but a lot of this work is being done by comparatively

49:45more affordable drones. And what that means, economically speaking, is pontoons are on the menu.

49:51We've seen images and video like the one on the right there of these mid and long-range strike drones being used to

49:56hit traffic traveling over pontoon bridges or to try and knock out the bridges themselves.

50:01In that case, you can visibly see the concrete barriers telling traffic, "Hey, don't go on the regular bridge, go over the

50:06pontoon instead." But, I dare say the burning truck and scorch marks might scare people off there as well.

50:12So, with large numbers of more affordable strike drones now available to complement the remaining missiles, it's possible these pontoon bridges won't

50:18be able to rely on economics as much of an ironclad defense.

50:22And even where Ukraine doesn't decide to target the bridges themselves, traffic over them is a potential As a general rule, especially

50:29if you don't schedule traffic very carefully, pontoon bridges can cause issues.

50:34Especially if you're dealing with a high traffic area, you can potentially end up with vehicles bunched up and waiting to cross,

50:39which can potentially provide easy targets.

50:41Even if traffic is properly scheduled and you don't have that accumulation, the vehicles crossing themselves have a defensive problem.

50:49Driving across a narrow pathway in the open with a speed limit that's going to make your average school zone look like

50:54the Silverstone And so, we've seen cases like the one you can see on the right there of drones apparently monitoring these

51:00bridges and striking trucks as they attempt to cross, which not only offers the truck itself as a comparatively low-speed target, it

51:07also, if the drone is successful, means you may temporarily block the bridge until the wreckage can be cleared out of the

51:13way. This is another area where the capabilities of the forces in 2026 differs so much from 2022 or 2023.

51:21Choke points like this are easy to monitor and there are more weapons available to potentially strike them.

51:26A worst-case scenario for Russia then might be Ukraine getting to the point with their drone force relative to Russian air defenses

51:32where the Ukrainians can do to some of these critical bridges something similar to what Russia's Rubicon did to the road to

51:37Svatove back during the Kursk offensive.

51:39Place a section under as close to full-time monitoring as possible and then make sure enough drones are being launched against it

51:45regularly enough to make traffic unacceptably risky.

51:48And given we now have cases of even FPVs being able to range out 60 odd kilometers from their launch point and

51:54maintain good connection, there are increasing number of tools available to interdict not just the supply vehicles themselves, but also other supporting

52:01elements. Think engineering vehicles, for example, excavators or cranes, the stuff you might have to bring in to make repairs or clear

52:08debris and rubble in the case of something like a train derailment, for example.

52:12The core point here is that while Russia has often been at its most effective choking off Ukrainian supply to frontline positions

52:18in critical sections of the front, the apparent Ukrainian approach here is to try and create major logistical issues for the Russians

52:25on a section of the front that isn't their primary priority.

52:28Because if you're able to create localized or regional shortages, break down transportation networks, the logic might go, they can make it

52:34harder and harder for the Russians to defend the targets that are left, and also for the Russian positions in situ to

52:40hold without additional resources or reinforcements.

52:43I think there is decent odds this Ukrainian flag we recently saw raised on the Ken Burns split was dropped by a

52:48drone, but the more degraded the supply situation becomes in some of these areas, potentially the more fragile the frontline might be,

52:55giving an opportunity for the Ukrainians to poke and potentially force the Russians to pay more attention and allocate additional resources.

2026 Dynamics 53:03

53:03A rough summary of some of the dynamics we're currently seeing then might go something like this.

53:07This is not really a case of one side, the Russians, having a monopoly over the initiative and being able to dictate

53:12exactly when and how the battles we fought.

53:15The Russians still get to choose the place or places where they put the main thrust of their effort.

53:19And where Russia decides to dedicate those kind of resources, the Ukrainians are forced to respond and potentially continue to give up

53:26territory. Ukraine's so-called mid-strike revolution hasn't robbed Russia of a lot of its typical advantages.

53:33They still have more available manpower, a significant advantage, especially in air delivered fires, and Russian drone units are generally very dangerous

53:41and often capable of commanding quantitative superiority over parts of the front.

53:45But attacking Ukraine, including using those Russian methods, is often a very, very difficult, expensive exercise.

53:51And Ukrainian adaptations appear to have made it even more so.

53:54Especially where the Russians are pushing the hardest, the Ukrainian situation is still often very difficult, and their forces still tired, stretched,

54:02and under pressure. But by most metrics so far, the front line does appear to be more stable than it was back

54:07in 2025. And far from just reacting to Russian attacks, the Ukrainians have been able to launch a campaign or campaigns of

54:13their own. Their focus appears to be more on trying to keep the front line as stable as possible, but then inflicting

54:18the maximum amount of damage beyond it.

54:21Going after the Russian war economy, defense production, and also politically significant targets like Moscow or Crimea that, if threatened, might force

54:29Russia to respond in certain ways.

54:31To put it in polite terms from a Russian perspective, the current logistical situation in Crimea is deeply suboptimal.

54:38And while there are plenty of adaptations the Russians can and are likely to make, it may well be the situation gets

54:43worse before it gets better. And sitting in the background of this calculus is that as some of these logistics links become

54:49more squeezed or cut off entirely, the peninsula and the supply lines connected to it become more and more reliant on the

54:55links that do remain. Chief of which is the Kerch Strait Bridge.

54:59You'll remember I've said in the past that the public narrative around the war has sometimes tended to overemphasize the importance of

55:04this thing, but I think it's fair to say now that as other road, rail, and maritime links become increasingly problematic for

55:10the Russians, the state of the bridge becomes a more and more strategic concern.

55:14So, I think we can expect the Russians to sink everything they can into making sure they defend it.

55:19While I wouldn't be surprised if the Ukrainians took another shot or 10 at potentially hitting it.

55:23Both the campaign in Crimea and the strikes further into Russia are all arguably part of the same Ukrainian strategic effort.

55:29A way to make it more likely the Russians will feel compelled to come back to the table in a serious way

55:33by stacking up the cost of the war in a way that makes it very difficult for the Russian public to ignore.

55:38The Russian Ministry of Defense can and does largely continue to publish a bunch of info saying that essentially the special military

55:44operation is going great. They can claim sky-high Ukrainian and NATO casualties, minimize the Russian ones, but it's much, much harder for

55:52them to force Russians not to notice that there are missiles and drones flying overhead, things are exploding, and on a completely

55:58unrelated note, there are now restrictions on buying gasoline.

56:02Russians are going to notice that borrowing costs are up, fuel availability and even members of the Russian population that pay basically

56:09no attention to any kind of media will still notice if at any point they're invited to pay a price that purchasing

56:14power parity adjusted might be equivalent to asking Americans to fork out 15 or 20-plus dollars a gallon.

56:21It may not be the kind of thing that necessarily collapses public support or a war effort, but it is the kind

56:25of thing that's difficult to hide.

56:27It may also be there's been a bit of a tone shift in parts of the Russian media.

56:31Less triumphalism about inevitable military victory, more complaints about strikes, and even some public fretting about the future of Crimea.

56:38Of course, none of this guarantees a change in decision-making by the Kremlin.

56:42Russia is a country with immense resources and a lot of capacity to absorb punishment the same way the Ukrainians have on

56:47the other side, but if the Kremlin's risk and pain tolerance was infinite, you can imagine they might have taken steps like

56:53declaring an additional mobilization a long time ago, nor would they feel the need for Russia's sky-high internal security budget.

56:59And so the Ukrainians might be hoping that eventually the combination of enough economic pain inflicted coupled with a slow enough rate

57:06of advance at the front might be enough to compel the Russians to change tack.

57:10But until or if that moment arrives, the adaptation race continues.

57:14For Russia to try and regenerate some momentum and take the territorial objectives they've set, for the Ukrainians to keep the front

57:20line as stable as possible while ramping up the damage and chaos behind it.

57:25In the first half of this year, the Ukrainians have arguably pulled the balance more back in their favor than in the

57:29equivalent period of 2025, and only time will now tell how things play out in the rest of And okay, very brief

Channel Update 57:36

57:37channel update to close out. First things first, I wasn't originally going to do another update on the progress of this campaign

57:41season so soon, but given how quickly some of these elements like mid-range strike have been scaling up, I thought it was

57:47worth highlighting some of the good and bad news from both sides' perspective before we move into the second half of the

57:51year. Over the next couple of weeks, my plan is to bring some of the more data-centric elements front and center so

57:57we can contextualize some of the elements we've talked about today like long-range strikes, interdiction, and frontline movements with some of the

58:03economic and military focused data sets that might help us better project things like future impacts and sustainability.

58:10In the interest of saving my voice, I'll hold any other updates over until next week.

58:13So, let me just say in closing, thank you very much all of you for watching as always, and with any luck,

58:18I'll see you all again next week.